

subjected to some" of these demands, so much so that he journeyed especially to Tokyo "to present before the Foreign Office his views for the modification of the terms." Can Mr. Kawakami really be serious? And is it believable that the future Japanese envoy would take strong objections to so innocuous an act as a "measure of precaution" by his own Government?

Coming to our own times, Kawakami gives his audience to understand that, in regard to the death of the Japanese bluejacket Nakayama on Dixwell Road in the autumn of 1935, "the Japanese naval authorities and the Japanese Consulate-General at Shanghai suppressed this murder for half a year for fear that it might excite the Japanese community!" A search through the files of Shanghai newspapers of those hectic days which caused a veritable exodus of Chinese residents from Chapei into the International Settlement, will at once reveal how undependable Mr. Kawakami is as a historian. His dogmatism is truly revealing.

China's task in this respect has been simplified by the

verities of her plight. As the poor victim of Japan's ruthless aggressions, China endeavored all these years to accommodate her neighbor's insatiable wishes, until she could retreat no longer without sacrificing the last shreds of her own self-respect. Then the limit of her toleration was reached at Lukouchiao on July 7 last year, and China was forced to choose between resistance or abject surrender. Having cast her die, China accepted the invader's punishment cheerfully and uncomplainingly, but with the implicit confidence that she would win in the end despite the temporary loss of more and more territory to the invader.

These are plain and honest-to-goodness facts. In proclaiming them to the world China's propagandists require no embellishments or highfalutin language. The stark nakedness of Japan's aggressions and the increasing toll of civilian and military casualties as well as the world's solemn condemnation of Dai Nippon as the aggressor occupying Chinese soil tell their own tales more vividly and eloquently than any reamsful of Chinese propaganda. If the task of Chinese propagandists has been simplified, they have Japan's militarists surely to thank.

## In Praise of the Spirit of "8-13"

(Contributed)

**T**HE spirit of "8-13" is the spirit of armed resistance against armed attack—the spirit of anti-imperialism!

Today, Chinese people in all parts of the country celebrate the first anniversary of the second Shanghai Incident. Indeed, we have good reasons to celebrate this memorable day, not just to observe its coming and passing.

It has been well said that the Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937) served as the prologue to the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937—, whereas the Shanghai Incident (Aug. 13, 1937) was the first scene in the Japanese show of force.

Since the so-called Mukden Incident (Sept. 18, 1931) China was preparing for an inevitable clash with Japan. As the result of Japan's repeated encroachments during the past 22 years, China reached "the limit of her endurance" on August 13, 1937. China was then fully determined, though not adequately prepared, to put up long-time resistance against the invaders. General Chiang's military strategy was carefully mapped out and has been strictly followed in the past 13 months. Personal life and property may be lost; province after province may be occupied; but national military plans, once formulated and decided, can not be lightly changed. The wisdom and foresight of China's long-time resistance have already borne fruit. Today, Japan is actually confronted with political, economic and social unrest at home and diplomatic failure and military reverses abroad.

To Japan "13" proves to be rather unlucky. For up to Aug. 13, 1937 Japan's political aggression and economic exploitation on the Asiatic continent approached the saturation point. And on that day Japanese politico-economic imperialism in China stepped beyond the danger line of "diminishing returns." It is an indisputable fact that Japan's armed adventure in China during the past year has

turned out to be a flat failure. What appeared to be another "China Incident" was transformed into a large-scale war in modern style. What little she has gained is nothing compared to what she has lost. In fact, the progress, prosperity and prestige of Dai Nippon since the good old days of the Meiji Era have been quickly bartered away by the venture for territorial conquest.

China's strong determination and immense capacity to resist Japan's "invincible" armed forces in the past 13 months have surprised not only many Nipponese militarists but also a few "die-hard" foreigners. When hostilities broke out on August 13 last, they firmly believed that Japan was bound to win and China doomed to defeat. But soon after the Chinese air force bombed the flag ship of the Japanese fleet *Idzumo* on the next day, they began to take a different view toward the Sino-Japanese conflict. It is a great pity that with all their profound knowledge of the Middle Kingdom they see in China a static, not a dynamic, country. Little wonder they could not visualize and understand the hidden meaning of the Shanghai Incident a year ago. But we should never forget that the vast majority of foreign residents in cosmopolitan Shanghai are sympathetic toward China's struggle against Japanese imperialism in spite of their abnormal, and at times precarious, existence on the "Isolated Island."

It was pointed out by certain critics that China should not have fought Japan in and around Shanghai last fall, because the Shanghai Incident has materially reduced the fighting power of the Chinese troops and caused unnecessary suffering and damage to foreign residents of this city. While this is admittedly true, it is equally true that Chinese resistance in the Shanghai-Woosung area for three successive months mobilized foreign public opinion and aroused world-wide sympathy. Without armed resist-

ance at Shanghai in 1937, would not foreign nations and peoples still regard China as "the sick man of the Orient" or "the sleeping lion?" It is part and parcel of China's plan of resistance that war in Shanghai would at once open the eyes of friendly Powers to the sinister motives of Japan's armed adventure and the true purpose of China's armed resistance.

In a nation-wide message to his fellow countrymen on August 12, General Chiang Kai-shek confidently stated: "Up to now, we have won the war at least from four different viewpoints: (1) Military strategy, (2) National unity, (3) Popular support and (4) Diplomatic success." In closing, China's fighting generalissimo (Gen. Chiang as described by Edgar Snow) urged all Chinese people to renew their energy and redouble their efforts to capture ultimate victory and ensure lasting peace. It goes without saying that China will continue to offer stubborn resistance and launch powerful attacks against the invaders in the next few months.

With the spectre of Soviet challenge recurring along the Manchurian border Japan really cannot afford to further penetrate into China's interior provinces. For China's Hankow may be Japan's Waterloo—who knows? What Japan should do now is to seek to effect an honorable withdrawal before it is too late. If Japanese troops

are not withdrawn from Chinese territory in the near future, they probably can never be withdrawn. At any rate, China will not change her present policy of long-time resistance so long as there is a single Nippon soldier on Chinese soil.

Of course, China desires peace—but not peace at any price. China wants no peace under diplomatic pressure. China will not accept an armistice, whether by direct negotiation or through mediation, which infringes upon her national independence, political sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity or impairs the rights and interests of neutral foreign Powers in violation of both the letter and spirit of the Open Door Doctrine and the Nine-Power Treaty.

The up-to-date situation of the Sino-Japanese hostilities was recently summarized by a local news commentator in his weekly radio broadcast: The Japanese may have won many battles, but Japan's war in China is now more than half lost. Perhaps, it does not seem premature to announce that on the honor roll of "World Powers" the name of the Japanese Empire has been erased; and in its place will be written a new name—the Republic of China.

Long live the spirit of "8-13"—the spirit of justice and peace—the spirit of national defence against armed invasion. It is the national spirit of new China.

## Agricultural Survey in Post-War Nanking

By PROFESSOR LEWIS S. C. SMYTHE

*(THIS is the fourth instalment of a comprehensive survey conducted by Professor Smythe and his assistants on behalf of the National International Relief Committee. It represents the first scientific attempt at assessing the damage to property and loss of human life in the urban and rural areas of Nanking before and after the withdrawal of the Chinese defence forces. The survey covered by this instalment extended from March 8 to 23. The first three instalments appeared in the last three issues (August 18 and 25, and September 1). The measure of units of weight, measurement and currency used in this instalment are defined by the author as follows: "The measure of grains and vegetables was a shih tan by weight which is 100 shih chin, or is one-half the metric quintal; 50 kilograms or 110.23 pounds, which is very close to the English hundred weight (112 lbs.); and is 0.83 of a picul. The mow used for measure of area is the local mow as reported by the farmers; but in calculations the Kiangning mow has been used, as it represents two-fifths of the cultivated area studied. It is equal to 0.06067 hectares. The shih mow (standard mow) referred to on occasion is slightly larger, 0.06667 hectares or one-sixth of an acre. All monetary values in these reports are in Chinese currency. For the period covered in the surveys, the Chinese dollar was practically steady at about \$3.40 per United States dollar or \$17.00 per British pound.")—Editor.*

THE Agricultural Survey attempted to cover the Ningshu Area, a natural and historical unit of six hsien grouped around Nanking. Two of the hsien, Kiangsu and Luho, lie north of the Yangtze River; while to the south are Kiangning (in which Nanking is located), Kuyung, Lishui, and Kaoshun. Owing to conditions explained in the section on Organization and Procedure, Kaoshun and half of Luho could not be investigated in March. The 4.5 hsien included in the survey had at that time a maximum of 1,080,000 farm population, probably 1,200,000 to 1,350,000 before the war. They also included market towns which originally had some 275,000 inhabitants; and the city of Nanking, formerly with a million, shrunken to approximately 250,000 in March. Thus the whole population of the 4.5 hsien was roughly a million and a half in March (the people of the market towns, however, do not enter the scope of the Surveys). The land area of the 4.5 hsien is 2438 sq. m.,<sup>2</sup>

about that of the States of Delaware or of two fair-sized English counties. Of this area, almost exactly one-third is cultivated, 819 sq. m. It is important to note the bulk of Kiangning Hsien in the Agricultural Survey. It comprises 41 per cent of the cultivated area in the 4.5 hsien, and almost the same percentage of the total farm population.

*Extent and Significance of Farm Losses:*—The five types of farm losses reported (buildings, labor animals, major farm implements, stored grain, crops destroyed) totalled nearly \$41,000,000 in the four and one-half hsien, or \$220 per family. It is important to note that the approximate annual income of a farm family in East Central China,

1. Estimated from Buck's figures in *Land Utilization in China Statistics*, p. 417.

2. Buck, *Statistics*, p. 24, shows the correct government figures to be 6315 sq. km. and 2122 sq. km., respectively, from which the sq. m. are now calculated.